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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

Chairman, Subgroup D, Panel III

SUBJECT : Proposed "DISCUSSION" and "RECOMMENDATIONS" Sections of the Subgroup D Report on Monitoring.

DISCUSSION

1. The problem of Subgroup D is to determine the part to be played by monitoring in evaluating the existing and potential threat of Soviet Bloc radio frequency usage and jamming capabilities. It is considered that monitoring is the most economical if not the only method of determining the extent of this threat to U. S. communications.

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2. In January, 1952, CIA was authorized to organize [REDACTED] operation to initiate efforts to evaluate Soviet Bloc jamming capabilities. A more recent action has directed that the Department of Defense assume the responsibilities for [REDACTED] program. Therefore, it would appear that the problem of responsibility for determining Soviet jamming capabilities has been resolved and need not be considered herein.

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3. CIA was also authorized to establish a Central File of Foreign Frequency Usage and Radio Station Particulars for the collection and evaluation of data on foreign usage of the radio spectrum. The same authority recommended that FCC facilities be expanded to provide additional monitoring data for the Central File; however, Congress denied the funds for this FCC expansion program. The CIA Central File could provide some information to aid in determining the Soviet Bloc threat with respect to frequency usage, but recent studies have determined that monitoring data currently available for inclusion in the file is inadequate to provide a basis for a comprehensive evaluation.

4. The inventory of U. S. government monitoring facilities shows that established locations are available for conducting a moderately intensive Soviet Bloc monitoring program. Primarily, all that remains is to provide add-

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ditional personnel and equipment at certain selected government facilities in order to accumulate data upon which an evaluation of the Soviet threat may be based.


5. It is generally agreed that a specific agency or department should be assigned the responsibility for coordination control of a Soviet Bloc monitoring program, and for evaluating the data received. Any one of the following agencies would have the capability of handling such a program since all are engaged in monitoring, each with a different objective: DOD, FCC, USIA, and CIA. Higher authority should determine which agency's objectives and capabilities are most compatible with the aims of this program.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. the following monitoring facilities be expanded, by the operating agencies, to permit monitoring of Soviet Bloc transmissions below 40 megacycles, by at least one operator on a 24 hour basis;

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FCC

Lanakai, T. H.
Fairbanks, Alaska
Spokane, Washington
Searsport, Maine
Grand Island, Nebraska
Allegan, Michigan

DOD

Nome, Alaska
Samsun, Turkey

USIA

Helsinki, Finland
Belgrade, Yugoslavia
Tehran, Iran
Colombo, Ceylon
Taipah, Formosa

2. monitoring facilities be established at the Air Force communication station, Thule, Greenland, to cover the blank spot in this area of world coverage;

3. monitoring data accumulated by all U. S. monitoring facilities, which

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might be of value in this program, be submitted to the control agency for
evaluation;

4. a department or agency be assigned responsibility for setting up a
coordination control and evaluation organization. This organization would set
forth operating and reporting procedures for the participating monitors; collect,
analyze, and evaluate the data received; and furnish reports to the Telecommu-
nications Planning Committee.

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CIA Member
Subgroup D

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